Household debt and foreign currency borrowing in new member states of the EU by Barrell, R et al.
Department of  
Economics and Finance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper No. 09-23 
 http://www.brunel.ac.uk/about/acad/sss/depts/economics
 
Ec
on
om
ic
s 
an
d 
Fi
na
nc
e 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
 S
er
ie
s 
Ray Barrell, E Philip Davis, Tatiana Fic  
and Ali Orazgani 
 
Household Debt and Foreign Currency 
Borrowing in New Member States of the 
EU  
 
June 2009 
HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND FOREIGN CURRENCY 
BORROWING  
IN NEW MEMBER STATES OF THE EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ray Barrell 1, E Philip Davis 1, 2, Tatiana Fic 1, 3 and Ali Orazgani 1  
NIESR and Brunel University 
London 
 
 
 
Abstract: In the light of rapidly rising household debt, we undertake panel estimation of 
determinants of debt-income ratios in new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe 
and interpret the results in the light of indicators of housing bubbles, estimates of equilibrium 
debt ratios from Western Europe and information on foreign currency borrowing in the CEE. 
We conclude that there are potential risks from overindebtedness in some of these countries, 
while in others where debt-income ratios appear sustainable, there remain risks related to high 
levels of foreign currency debt, notably where there is a floating exchange rate. Important 
issues are raised for future economic performance as well as the structure of banking 
regulation. 
 
Keywords: Transition economies, household debt, house price bubbles, foreign currency 
debt 
JEL: D14, F34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 2 Dean Trench Street, Smith 
Square, London SW1P 3HE, United Kingdom  
2. Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK 
3. National Bank of Poland, Swietokrzyska 19/21, 01-919 Warsaw, Poland  
The authors thank colleagues at NIESR for helpful suggestions and advice. 
 2
1 Introduction 
 
Over recent years, many new members of the EU have been experiencing rapid 
growth of debt in the household sector. Strong credit growth is an essential element of the 
catching-up process, as it implies financial deepening in the household sector. However, it 
may also constitute a risk factor for these countries’ financial and macroeconomic 
performance, as excessive household indebtedness, especially if it is in foreign currency, may 
increase their susceptibility to financial crises as well as prolonged periods of slow economic 
growth as balance sheets are corrected.  
This paper looks at indebtedness of households and its determinants in ten of the new 
members of the EU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. We apply a panel model to assess the long run sustainability 
of the level of debt in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Then, we discuss risks related 
to the fact that much of the increased borrowing is in foreign currency. 
 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some stylised facts on 
indebtedness in new member states of the EU and selected old members as comparator 
countries. Section 3 looks at recent literature on this area, while Section 4 presents results of 
estimation of a panel model of debt in selected new and old member states. We attempt to 
assess the sustainability of new member states’ debt, referring to individual countries’ 
fundamentals: GDP per capita, interest rates, and house prices. Section 5 discusses risks 
associated with the possibility of occurrence of bubbles in house prices and cycles in GDP per 
capita and interest rates that may affect the computation of the sustainable level of debt to 
income. Short-, medium- and long-term risks of excessive indebtedness identified on the basis 
of the estimated model are shown in section 6. Section 7 focuses on non-model risks for 
households (risks exogenous to the estimated model) resulting from foreign currency 
borrowing. Last section concludes.  
 
2 Stylized facts 
 
Over recent years household indebtedness has been growing rapidly in a number of 
Central and Eastern European countries. The expansion of household debt observed in the 
new members of the EU may result from two factors: the convergence process - in which case 
the expanding indebtedness constitutes a necessary element of the long term macroeconomic 
equilibrium - and short term borrowing trends driven by the business cycle or by autonomous 
factors such as financial liberalisation driven by international competition or foreign 
ownership of the banking system. These may result in credit and asset price booms, posing 
risks of overheating to the economy and of financial instability in the downturn.  
Figure 1 shows the ratio of personal sector debt to personal income in ten new 
member states: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and four economies of the Euro Area: Belgium, France, 
Germany and Italy. These ratios vary significantly between the four old member states, but 
over time these countries have been converging, with Germany and France ending the data 
period with ratios just below one. They have also generally been rising, except perhaps in the 
case of Germany, and this may suggest either convergence or an income elasticity of demand 
in excess of one. All the new member states exhibit per capita income levels below that in 
Italy in 1995, and hence strong differences in institutional finance factors would be need to 
explain the sped at which these economies have moved to or even surpassed Italian levels of 
borrowing in 1995 
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Figure 1. Personal sector debt to personal income ratios  
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Note: BG=Belgium, BL=Bulgaria, CR=Czech Republic, GE=Germany, ES=Estonia, FR=France, HU=Hungary, 
IT=Italy, LI=Lithuania, LV=Latvia, PO=Poland, RM=Romania, SL=Slovenia 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
The figure illustrates that new member states’ debt levels have been catching up 
relatively rapidly with levels observed in the old members of the EU (the solid lines illustrate 
the debt to personal income paths for the four countries of Western Europe, the thin lines 
correspond to the debt to income trajectories for the new member states). The fastest pace of 
debt growth has been recorded in the Baltic states. The levels of debt in Estonia and Latvia 
have reached Western European levels. It is difficult to disentangle how much of the change 
is due to a sustainable process of convergence and how much might be driven by financial 
deregulation and the excessive accumulation of debt. However, it is clear that the rapid debt 
growth has contributed to the overheating of the Baltic economies, and consequently to the 
“hard landing” the Baltic countries have been experiencing. The debt to income ratios in 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been increasing relatively moderately. The 
levels of household debt in countries of Southern Europe, Romania and Bulgaria, although 
increasing, have remained at low levels, which may be due to a relatively lower level of 
financial development in these countries. 
 
3 Recent literature 
 
The literature on credit growth in new member states has analysed risks of excessive 
indebtedness of households and enterprises from different perspectives. Egert et al. (2006) 
focus on equilibrium levels of private credit to GDP in 11 countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. The authors use a panel of small open OECD economies (estimated with various 
techniques – fixed effects OLS, panel dynamic OLS and the MGE) to derive the equilibrium 
credit level for transition countries on the basis of a set of fundamentals encompassing  GDP 
per capita, bank credit to the public sector, nominal lending rates, inflation rates, the spread, 
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and house prices. Their results suggest a number of Central and Eastern European countries 
are very close or above the equilibrium levels, whereas others are still below the equilibrium. 
Kiss and Vonnak (2006) also use panel techniques to identify the equilibrium level of credit 
to GDP, disentangling between trend, cycle and boom. The authors show that although in 
most countries a large part of the credit growth can be explained by fundamentals, risks to 
stability of the financial system may be observed in Estonia and Lithuania.  
Foreign currency lending, its determinants, as well as risks which it may pose to the 
stability of the financial system have been analysed by several authors. Rosenberg and Tripak 
(2008) investigate the determinants of foreign currency lending in new members of the EU. 
They find that loan to deposit ratios, openness and interest rate differential are key variables 
in explaining foreign currency lending across countries. Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2007) focus 
on substitution effects between domestic currency and foreign currency loans, suggesting that 
restrictive monetary policy leads to a decrease in domestic currency lending and an increase 
in foreign currency lending making the central bank’s job of providing both monetary and 
financial stability harder.  
The direct link between credit booms and episodes of banking system distress is 
studied by Barajas et al. (2007). Using a logit model for 100 countries the authors find that 
larger and more prolonged credit booms, and also those coinciding with high inflation and/or 
low economic growth, are more likely to result in a crisis. Davis and Karim (2008) also found 
a significant impact of credit growth on banking crises, especially if it was interacted with 
deposit insurance provision. Other significant variables included credit/GDP, M2/reseves, 
fiscal balance./GDP, inflation, real interest rates and economic growth. 
 
4 The model of debt to income ratio 
 
To assess the scale of the excessive indebtedness of households in the new member 
states we estimate the equilibrium level of personal sector debt to income, which we define as 
the level that would correspond to economic fundamentals. Using a panel model we estimate 
the long term relationship between household debt and determinants of its sustainable growth: 
GDP per capita, long term interest rates, and house prices. An increase in GDP per capita is 
expected to result in an increase in household debt ratios as part of the convergence process. 
Lower interest rates should promote credit to the private sector, implying a negative 
relationship between the interest rate and debt. A rise in house prices usually leads to 
increases in households’ indebtedness (a significant proportion of recent increases in debt has 
resulted from housing debt).  
The model encompasses new member states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania)1 and major economies of the Euro Area (Germany, France, 
Italy, Belgium) as comparator countries. The sample includes annual data for the period 1996 
-2007.  
Results of the estimation for the long run are the following (t-Statistics in 
parentheses): 
)ln(21.0006.0)ln(64.091.5
)2.9()2.2()9.7()1.8( tttt
PHLRGDPDEBT +−+−=
−−
    (1) 
R2=0.98, DW=0.61 
where DEBT denotes the debt to personal income ratio, GDP  is GDP per capita, LR is the 
long term interest rate and PH is house prices. There is some evidence here that debt is a 
                                                 
1 The selection of countries is dictated by data availability 
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‘superior’ good in that the desired debt to income ratio rises with GDP per capita. It also rises 
with real house prices and declines with real interest rate increases. The last decade or so has 
seen rapid income growth in the new members, along with declining real interest rates, and 
hence it is not surprising that debt to income ratios have been rising rapidly. Fixed effects 
were included in the estimation; they may, to some extent, reflect differences in the financial 
structure of the countries in the sample (we tried to extend the estimated model including a 
measure of the banking sector reform (index produced by the EBRD), however, this variable 
proved to be insignificant). Group unit root tests suggest that the residual series are stationary 
– we test both for a common unit root test, as well as individual unit root processes (see table 
1). 
 
Table 1. Unit root tests 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.1789  0.0000  10  85 
Breitung t-stat -1.708  0.0438  10  75 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  45.7  0.0009  10  85 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  39.8  0.0053  10  91 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
The short run dynamics are described by the following equation: 
)ln(15.0005.0)ln(77.024.0
)2.5()8.1()7.7(1)4.3(1 tttttt
PHLRGDPECTDEBTDEBT Δ+Δ−Δ+−=
−−−−
 (2) 
R2= 0.98, DW = 1.19 
and the speed of the adjustment term ECT implies that about 25 per cent of a shock is 
corrected each year, although the additional dynamic terms in equation (2) speed up the 
process of adjustment and point to some initial overshooting. 
Results of examination of residuals for the above estimation show that the personal 
sector debt to income ratio in the new member states has largely evolved in line with its 
fundamentals - that is GDP per capita, the real interest rate and house prices. There is, 
however, some evidence of excessive debt growth in Estonia, and possibly the other Baltic 
economies and Hungary – figure 2 shows residuals of the long term relationship for two 
selected new member states Estonia and Hungary; compare also figure 7 where we plot the 
actual paths of the debt to income (thick solid lines) and paths predicted by the model (thin, 
dotted lines).  
 
Figure 2. Estonian and Hungarian residuals (the long term relationship) 
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5 Cycles, bubbles and associated risks 
 
The evolution of the debt to income ratio in line with its determinants - GDP per 
capita, interest rates and house prices does not necessarily guarantee the sustainability of the 
debt growth. Both GDP per capita and interest rates, as well as house prices are subject to 
cycles and/or bubbles. If cycles are reversed, and/or bubbles burst, the debtors are still left 
with high amounts of debt to repay, so as to reduce the level of the debt to income ratio to a 
new equilibrium. This in turn may entail widespread defaults, or at least sluggish 
consumption as balance sheets adjust. This section looks at the cyclicality of GDP and interest 
rates and the scale of possible house price bubble that may affect assessment of the 
sustainability of the debt to income ratio in individual countries. 
We start by investigating recent house price developments (where we view bubbles as 
indicated by a greater deviation from equilibrium than is warranted by the cycle). A 
significant proportion of the rise in personal sector debt has been secured on housing assets. 
There fact that house price bubbles may have developed in some of the new member states, 
may put household borrowers at serious risk. Once the bubble bursts, the level of debt cannot 
adjust immediately, but may generate significant defaulting on loans.  
Figure 3 shows the growth rate of house prices in new members of the EU and major 
economies of the Euro Area.  
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Figure 3. House price growth in the new member states and the major economies of the Euro Area 
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Note: BG=Belgium, BL=Bulgaria, CR=Czech Republic, GE=Germany, ES=Estonia, FR=France, HU=Hungary, 
IT=Italy, LI=Lithuania, LV=Latvia, PO=Poland, SR=Slovak Republic 
Source: the data were obtained from the ECB (which is gratefully acknowledged) 
Countries reporting the highest growth of house prices have been the Baltics and 
Bulgaria. Over the period 2000-2007 the average growth rate of house prices in the new 
member states significantly exceeded the average growth rate of house prices in the selected 
old members of the EU. The volatility of NMS house price growth also remained higher than 
that of the old members of the EU; 21.2 per cent in the new versus 3.5 per cent in the old 
members (we compute the volatility of house prices growth over the period 2000-2007 and 
take the average across the new and the old member states).  
The character of housing developments in new member states is also somewhat 
different from the behaviour of prices of houses in Western European countries. House price 
developments in new member states tend to lag behind house price developments in the old 
members of the EU – see figure 4. This may suggest that the new member states are in an 
earlier phase of the cycle.  
 
Figure 4. Average house prices growth (%) – in the new member states (NMS) and the major old 
members of the Euro Area (OMS) 
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The higher house prices growth in the new member states can be partially explained 
by fundamental factors - an acceleration in income growth, the relatively low interest rates 
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and higher demand for housing generated by cohorts of small baby booms of the 1970s 
entering their prime earning age (Egert and Mihaljek, 2007). There are also transition-related 
factors: development of housing markets and housing finance, and greater provision of long 
term housing loans by banks. In addition, while it is difficult to obtain data on the level of 
house prices, the available evidence suggests that house prices started at a relatively low level, 
given the standard determinants of equilibrium house prices such as income and real interest 
rates. There exist, however, strong demand pressures on new member states housing markets, 
suggesting that house prices may exhibit bubble properties. This in turn may have been 
supported by the scale of foreign ownership of banks and the degree of foreign currency 
borrowing by the personal sector. Figure 5 illustrates  the relationship between the house 
prices growth and the scale of foreign ownership of banks and the degree of foreign currency 
borrowing of the household sector.  
 
Figure 5. Demand pressures on new member states housing markets 
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An assessment of the scale of the bubble is difficult. As a first approximation we 
compute the difference between actual house prices and their HP smoothed values2 and 
compare it with other available information. Goodhart and Hoffmann (2002) undertake a 
similar procedure. As an alternative measure, we look at the construction cost of new 
dwellings relative to house prices. Figure 6 shows these two measures of house price bubbles 
for Estonia  (where figure 6a shows the difference between the growth rate of actual (ESHP) 
and smoothed (ESHP_hp) series of house prices and the difference between the growth rate of 
actual house prices (ESHP) and the growth rate of the cost of construction of new dwellings 
(ESCD); (where the difference between these two growth rates reflects largely the growth rate 
of land prices). Figure 6b shows the growth rates of the three series with shaded areas 
indicating possible bubble periods) for Estonia (the country with the highest growth of house 
prices materialising over the recent years). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 To minimise the inaccuracy of the HP filter at ends of the sample we extend the sample period (including 
forecasts for 2009 and 2010). The HP smoothed values of the house price level remain, however, surrounded by 
considerable uncertainty (and the size of the bubble may still be underestimated). 
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Figure 6. House price bubble indicators for Estonia 
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An analogous procedure of HP filtering is applied to GDP per capita and interest rate 
series and the smoothed series approximate the long run equilibrium level of GDP per capita 
and interest rates. To show GDP cycle-driven risks related to indebtedness of households in 
figure 7 we plot the relationship between the output gap (left axis) and the ratio of 
nonperforming loans (right axis) for a Central European country - Poland and a Baltic 
economy – Estonia. Table 2 details the level of the share of non-performing loans in each 
country, where an increasing level of such loans can reflect either unwise lending or a 
deteriorating macroeconomic situation which would imply that shares of bad loans in total 
loans increase.  
 
Figure 7. Output gap and nonperforming loans in Poland and Estonia 
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Table 2. Non-performing loans as a share of total loans 
  Bulgaria 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
1995 12.5 31.5 2.4 na 18.9 17.3 23.9 37.9 41.3 9.3 
1996 15.2 30.6 2 na 20.5 32.2 14.7 48 31.8 10.1 
1997 13 30.2 2.1 6.6 10 28.3 11.5 56.5 33.4 10 
1998 11.8 31.5 4 7.9 7 12.5 11.8 58.5 44.3 9.5 
1999 17.5 37.8 2.9 4.4 6.2 11.9 14.9 35.4 32.9 9.3 
2000 10.9 33.8 1.3 3.1 4.5 10.8 16.8 5.3 26.2 9.3 
2001 7.9 14.5 1.2 3 2.8 7.4 20.5 3.5 24.3 10 
2002 5.6 9.4 0.8 4.9 2 5.8 24.7 2.3 11.2 10 
2003 4.4 5 0.5 3.8 1.4 2.6 25.1 1.5 9.1 9.4 
2004 3.7 4.1 0.3 3.7 1.1 2.4 17.4 1.7 7.2 7.5 
2005 3.8 4 0.2 3.1 0.7 0.7 11.6 1.7 5.5 6.4 
2006 3.2 3.8 0.2 3 0.5 1 7.7 1.8 7.1 5.5 
2007 2.5 2.8 0.5 2.8 0.4 1.1 5.4 3 2.6 3.9 
Source: EBRD 
 
6 The absolute equilibrium and individual NMS’ sustainable convergence paths 
 
In this section, we use the estimated model as a tool to determine the level of absolute 
equilibrium and individual countries’ sustainable convergence paths (steady state growth 
paths). The concept initially derives from Kiss, Nagy and Vonnak (2007).  
The key distinctive feature of our approach is that we assume that equilibrium levels 
of debt to income should correspond to equilibrium levels of its determinants, that is GDP per 
capita, interest rates and house prices – otherwise the equilibrium measure of the debt to 
income would be affected by (GDP and interest rate) cycles and (house price) bubbles.  
The absolute equilibrium is defined by the average equilibrium debt to income ratio in 
developed economies (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium). We create bands around the central 
value by taking minimum and maximum values of the equilibrium debt to income ratios 
observed in developed economies. The sustainable convergence path is defined as a debt to 
income ratio resulting from equilibrium levels of GDP per capita, interest rates and house 
prices (equilibrium values of GDP per capita, interest rates and house prices were computed 
using Hodrick Prescott filter).  
Figure 8 shows debt to income developments in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Estonia against the background of their convergence paths and the absolute equilibrium. 
These can be compared to the residuals from their part of the dynamic equation estimated 
above which show the degree of divergence form some sort of equilibrium process. 
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Figure 8. Debt to income ratios, individual countries’ sustainable convergence paths and the absolute 
equilibrium – Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia 
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The indebtedness of households in Central European economies has remained 
relatively closer to their sustainable convergence paths. The medium term debt path in the 
Czech Republic may have reached the absolute equilibrium territory. In Hungary the debt to 
income ratio has exceeded its sustainable convergence growth path.  
In recent years the indebtedness of households in Baltic countries has been growing 
faster than that observed in Central European economies. The debt growth in Estonia has 
exceeded not only its convergence equilibrium path, but also what the absolute equilibrium 
level would suggest. This may indicate that serious excessive indebtedness that has 
materialised in Estonia.  
The identification of the absolute equilibrium level, individual economies’ sustainable 
convergence paths and fundamentals-consistent paths (predicted by the model using 
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unsmoothed values of GDP per capita, interest rates and house prices (in figure 9 we plot 
results of a scenario in which allow GDP per capita and interest rates to follow their actual 
paths, while we modify the path of house prices (to eliminate the possible bubble)) allows us 
to determine three types of risks associated with the lack of long-, medium- and short-term 
sustainability of NMS household sector’s debt. Table 3 summarises the three types of risks for 
the analysed NMS (the higher the deviation of the observed debt from the long-, medium- and 
short-term sustainable path the higher the risk). 
Table 3. Risks of excessive indebtedness 
Country Long term risk 
Deviation from the 
absolute eq.  path 
Medium term risk 
Deviation from the 
convergence path 
Short term risk 
Deviation from the 
model path 
Estonia high  high high 
Latvia low  high serious risks of a 
bubble in house prices 
Lithuania low  low risks of a bubble in 
house prices 
Hungary low high high 
Czech Republic low  low  low  
Poland  low  low  low  
 
 
7 Issues arising from foreign currency borrowing 
 
Borrowers in the new member states are also exposed to risks arising from a high level 
of unhedged foreign currency borrowing, which the model above does not take into account. 
A similar risk crystallised in Asian countries in 1997 (for the private sector)_and in 1982 in 
Latin America (for the public sector). It was also popular in some West European economies, 
such as Italy and the Nordic countries in the early 1990s (Drees et al., 1998 and Rosenberg, 
2008), leading to losses following the ERM crisis of 1992-3. While foreign currency loans 
allow borrowers to take advantage of lower interest rates and less restricted credit from 
abroad, it introduces direct and indirect risks to both lenders and borrowers, and the 
magnitude of these risks depends on the borrower, the currency of denomination and the 
domestic currency regime.  
The level of foreign currency borrowing has increased significantly in recent years in 
most of the NMS (exceptions are the Czech and Slovak Republics). While taking a loan in 
foreign currency may be attractive to households in the short run for a lower interest rate, in 
the longer term this will expose them to risks of a depreciation of the domestic currency and 
an increase in foreign interest rates. As access to foreign currency borrowing is relatively 
novel in these economies, a lack of risk awareness appears to exist among households in 
many countries and equally among lenders. Insufficient risk awareness has encouraged “herd 
behaviour” in foreign currency borrowing in some countries, as borrowers followed the 
borrowing behaviour of others rather than relying on their own risk information (ECB 2006). 
This type of behaviour can leave economies overexposed to risk.  
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Figure 9. The currency composition of the household debt  
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Note: BL=Bulgaria, CR=Czech Republic, ES=Estonia, HU=Hungary, LI=Lithuania, LV=Latvia, PO=Poland, 
RO=Romania, SL=Slovenia, SR=Slovakia 
Source: national central banks 
 
Table 4. Household sector’s foreign currency borrowing as percent of GDP 
 BL CR ES HU LI LV PO RM SL SR 
2004 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 
2005 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.00 
2006 0.03 0.00 0.31 0.07 0.08 0.30 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.00 
2007 0.05 0.00 0.35 0.11 0.13 0.35 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.01 
2008 0.08 0.00 0.40 0.17 0.17 0.35 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.01 
Note: BL=Bulgaria, CR=Czech Republic, ES=Estonia, HU=Hungary, LI=Lithuania, LV=Latvia, PO=Poland, 
RO=Romania, SL=Slovenia, SR=Slovakia 
Source: national central banks 
 
Figure 9 shows the currency composition of household debt across countries using 
central bank data for each country, whilst table 4 gives total household foreign currency 
borrowing as a proportion of nominal GDP. The table gives an indication of risks faced by 
household when the domestic exchange rate changes against all other currencies, whilst the 
currency compositions can indicate specific risks if there is a large amount of borrowing in 
currencies other than in euros, as in Hungary. The highest level of borrowing in foreign 
currencies is found in Estonia, but its currency board supported exchange rate peg is probably 
the most credible in the region. Borrowing as a percentage of GDP is almost as high in Latvia, 
which also has a currency board, but is lower in the other Baltic state, currency board country, 
Lithuania. Household borrowing in foreign currency as a proportion of nominal GDP is as 
high in floating rate Hungary as it is in fixed rate Lithuania, and hence risks have to be seen as 
higher in Hungary. The growth of borrowing is also worrying in that country. Poland and 
Romania have less foreign currency borrowing and are less subject to bankruptcy risk in the 
household sector, and such risks seem to be absent in the Slovak and Czech Republics where 
foreign currency borrowing is almost completely absent. 
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As long as the Baltic states’ currencies and Bulgarian lev are pegged to the euro, the 
borrowers’ vulnerability to shifts in exchange rates is limited. Relatively large and unsecured 
borrowing in foreign currency (and mainly the Swiss franc) characterises the borrowing of the 
Hungarian household sector. Almost 60 per cent of household debt is denominated in foreign 
currencies and the recent substantial depreciation of the forint has increased the risk of 
insolvency of Hungarian borrowers. Households in Poland and Romania also have a relatively 
high exposure to exchange rate risk. The accession of Slovenia to the Eurozone has 
significantly reduced risks to households borrowing in foreign currency, as a large share of 
the debt was denominated in euro. Once Slovakia entered the Eurozone, the tiny share of euro 
denominated loans in Slovakia became loans denominated in domestic currency. 
The share of borrowing in foreign currencies in new member states has tended to rise 
over time. This results from the rising integration of new member states’ financial markets 
with their Western European counterparts, reflected also in the growing importance of 
foreign-owned banks. The greater demand for capital resulting from the convergence 
processes also plays a role. The shortage of capital in domestic markets means that investors 
tend to borrow in foreign markets, and lower foreign interest rates increase the attractiveness 
of loans denominated in foreign currency. The interest rate differential is one of the major 
factors taken into account by households, while they apparently disregarded currency risk. 
This activity is often described as the ‘carry trade’ and it exposes the household sector to 
significant but underestimated risks.  
While the growing borrowing in foreign currencies is, to some extent, a feature of the 
catching up process in Europe, the enhanced volatility of new member states currencies 
accompanying the recent global financial crisis poses a serious risk to borrowers’ solvency. A 
depreciation of the domestic currency will hamper the repayment capability of households 
and consequently raise the risk of the default. The exchange rate risk can be exacerbated – or 
mitigated – by currency regimes within which countries operate. In the case of borrowing in 
euro, the accession to the Eurozone fully eliminates the exchange rate risk; pegging the 
domestic currency to the euro in ERM II may reduce the risk significantly. Table 5 shows the 
exchange rate regimes in the new member states. 
Table 5. Exchange rate regimes in the new member states 
Regime Country 
EMU Slovenia Slovakia     
ERM II Estonia  Lithuania Latvia   
Floating 
exchange rate Czech Republic Poland  Hungary Romania 
Currency Board Bulgaria       
(countries in italics fix the central exchange rate) 
 
By joining the euro area, Slovakia practically eliminated the exposure of household 
debt to exchange rate risk, while Slovenian households retain some debt that may be 
denominated in currencies other than the euro. The exposure of households in Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania to exchange rate risk is limited, as most of the foreign currency borrowing is 
denominated in euro and the domestic currency is pegged to the euro. The currency board 
regime also shelters Bulgarian borrowers in foreign currency, although as the currency 
remains outside ERM II they face a greater risk of exchange rate realignment. In countries 
with floating exchange rates – Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Romania – exchange 
rate risk remains relatively substantial, although households in the Czech Republic face little 
risk due to domestic regulation. In effect, economies with a floating exchange rate and larger 
shares of borrowing in foreign currency (e.g. Hungary and Romania) may be exposed to 
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serious risks. Figure 10 shows the relationship between exchange rate volatility and the share 
of foreign currency borrowing, highlighting the exposure of Hungary, Romania and Poland.  
 
Figure 10. Foreign currency borrowing and exchange rate volatility, 2005-2008 
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Note: BL=Bulgaria, CR=Czech Republic, ES=Estonia, HU=Hungary, LI=Lithuania, LV=Latvia, PO=Poland, 
RM=Romania, SL=Slovenia (2005-2006), SR=Slovakia 
Source: national central banks, NIGEM 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have shown that debt-income ratios in new member states of Central and Eastern Europe 
have evolved broadly in line with fundamentals, given the convergence process underway in 
these economies. Nevertheless, there are potential risks from overindebtedness in some of 
these countries, notably Estonia, given trends in fundamentals and the risk of a house price 
bubble. Even in other countries whose debt-income ratios appear sustainable, there remain 
risks related to high levels of foreign currency debt. The degree of risk links also to the 
exchange rate regime, and suggests particular risks for borrowers in floating-rate Hungary  
 
Even if banking crises do not result from household debt, there remains a risk across the New 
Member States that falling house prices will require balance sheet adjustments by households. 
This could stunt economic growth for some years to come. Furthermore, given the importance 
of foreign banks in CEE, these risks put a spotlight on the lack of control host country 
regulators have on banks from other member states. It is arguable that desirable measures of 
macroprudential regulation can only be attained by giving EU precedence to host regulators 
(and limitation of presence to subsidiaries) – or shifting overall banking regulation in the EU 
to a supranational institution. 
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